Introduction
In periods of increased volatility and crisis the concept of economic liberalization comes under rigorous scrutiny, and even attack. Under stressful conditions, people often blame liberalization for all the ills in the domestic and international economies. As Mexcico gradually recovers from its crash of 1994-95, this chapter describes the elements of the preceding financial liberalization, explaining its contribution to the collapse.
A particular objective of this chapter is to examine the impact of changes in the policy framework and the external environment upon interest rates and bank spreads in Mexico during episodes of financial liberalization. These changes took place under relatively high and volatile rates of interest and inflation, and under diverse exchange-rate regimes.
The paper is divided into four sections, starting with an overview of Mexico's process of financial liberalization in a rapidly changing macroeconomic and external environment. Section 2 describes of the timing and the sequence of the various measures adopted. Section 3 examines the results of financial liberalization, using an interest-rate spread analysis. In this section, it is shown that during periods of financial restriction, pricing of financial services is not necessarily lower than in a liberalized environment, but it is certainly much less transparent. Finally, we characterize some elements of the Mexican experience by comparison with other cases, before offering some concluding remarks.
The Financial Liberalization Process and Macroeconomic Turning Points
Mexico's recent financial and macroeconomic history is punctuated by several major turning points. The first one occurred in 1982, with an exchange-rate crisis, high inflation and the nationalization of the banking system. The second involved interest-rate liberalization and an end to high inflation. The third consisted of bank re-privatization, which took place under manageable yet unstable macroeconomic conditions. The fourth and final turning-point (1994) was precipitated by the shock of the Tequila Crisis.
In the 1960s and 1970s interest rates in Mexico were remarkably stable, with very little variation throughout these two decades.
3 Savings deposits received low returns (4.5 percent for many years). In the 1970s this often resulted in negative interest rates in real terms, as well as low aggregate savings rates and little financial deepening. 4 Over extended periods of time, the economy was characterized by financial repression, with directed allocation of bank credit to preferential sectors of the economy. As a result, bank credit to the private sector in Mexico declined dramatically between the 1970s and the 1980s. Commercial bank credit to the private sector as a proportion of GDP declined from 19.5 percent in 1972 to only 10.4 percent in 1988, following the nationalization of the banking sector in 1982.
The Lopez Portillo presidency ended with the 1982 balance of payments crisis and the nationalization of the Mexican banking system. Banks were accused of making excessive profits, behaving monopolistically, and facilitating capital flight from Mexico. To make the nationalization process more difficult to reverse, Articles 28 and 123 of the Constitution were changed to prohibit private bank ownership. Out of the 60 banks in operation, the government nationalized 58, giving its owners Indemnification Bonds. 5 The new De la Madrid administration started a process of consolidation and restructuring in 1983, closing nine banks and merging the remaining 49 into 29 banks. There were two more rounds of bank consolidation in 1985 and 1986 , which left 18 state-owned banks by the beginning of the privatization process undertaken by the Salinas Administration in 1991-92. 6 Until the end of the 1980s, Mexican financial markets continued to be repressed through: 1) high reserve requirements; 2) credit rationing; and 3) controlled interest rates for deposits and loans. Supervision and enforcement were the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank. In Mexico, like in most Latin American countries, these "dirigiste" policies were the norm rather than the exception.
In the late 1980s, policies on credit and interest rates began to change. Success in implementing a fiscal adjustment program significantly reduced crowding out of the private sector by the government. In October 1988 7 the first legal initiatives to eliminate credit rationing were introduced. It was decided that bank funds raised by the issuance of acceptances and debentures could be freely invested, rather than being compulsorily channeled to selected priority sectors.
The liberalization process continued in 1989 with the deregulation of interest rates and the implementation of additional measures to foster access to capital by firms listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange. Firms were allowed to issue non-preferential shares aimed at attracting foreign investors. Before this reform, foreign investment in most stocks was limited to 49 percent of the total. In December of that year, Congress approved laws promoting the placement of a greater number of Mexican securities in international financial markets. A "special section" within the National Stock Registry was created for stocks in Mexican firms issued on foreign markets. Specialized firms were also authorized to offer rating services for securities, and rating requirements for issues of new commercial papers were established (Babatz, 1997) . The financial liberalization process culminated in 1991-92 when ownership of the state-owned banks 5 Only Citibank and a union-controlled bank (Banco Obrero) were not nationalized. 6 See Unal and. Navarro (1997) . 7 Mexico's policy of financial liberalization dates back to 1982, when interest rate ceilings were eliminated on the initial public offerings of government-issued treasury bills. This allowed institutional investors to place competitive bids at the central bank auctions. The most significant liberalization measures were adopted in 1988.
was transferred to the private sector and most of the industry's barriers to local entry 8 were eliminated.
The privatization and liberalization of the banking system had a number of flaws, which planted the seeds of the subsequent crisis. Firstly, liberalization of the banking system was not complemented by a strong system for banking regulation and supervision. Secondly, the banks were in many cases purchased by individuals or consortia with little prior banking experience and dubious ethical standards, while the prices paid were a multiple of their book value. 9 Thirdly, banking and supervisory skills in general had deteriorated in the previous two decades, as the banking system had essentially degenerated into a mobilizer of funds for the government. Fourthly, prior due-diligence reviews were inadequate, and the quantity and quality of capital was less than desirable. Finally, certain pieces of banking and commercial legislation (such as the norms related to secured lending and bankruptcy) remained untouched, and this resulted in moral hazard.
After the privatization of the banks, credit to the private sector recovered rapidlyindeed too rapidly in that credit grew as much as eight times faster than GDP in the years prior to the 1994 crisis. Commercial bank credit to the private sector as a proportion of GDP increased from 29 percent in 1992 to 41 percent in 1994.
Having paid premium prices for the banks, the "new bankers" were under considerable pressure to make loans in order to recover their investment. Insider and related lending was also a common problem. This combination of factors, in an environment of lax banking supervision, led to excessive risk-taking that rendered the banking system highly vulnerable to a crisis -as was borne out in 1994-95. As an increasing share of the banks' portfolios started to perform badly, banks raised their lending spreads to cover these losses; which depressed investment demand. 8 Restrictions on foreign investors in the larger Mexican banks remained until late 1998. 9 An increase in the value of the banks was expected, since economic reforms had increased the prospective profitability of banks (see Pritchett, 1996) . That the prices paid may have reflected too much optimism became clear even before the 1995 crisis occurred (World Bank, 1994) .
The Timing of Financial Liberalization
The 1987-88 recession paved the way for the adoption of a new stabilization program. This was aimed at the permanent diminution of the federal budget deficit and a reduction in inflation, through a restrictive monetary policy combined with the adoption of exchange-rate bands which, in reality, were equivalent to a fixed exchange-rate regime. Table 1 shows the macroeconomic results of the stabilization program and the conditions prevailing at the time of the 1988-89 financial liberalization program. Inflation declined from a peak of 100 percent in 1988 to 16 percent in 1992. Government finances reversed from a significant deficit of 13 percent of GDP in 1988 to a primary budget surplus in 1992, assisted by revenue from the privatization process.
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However, warning-bells were sounded by the accelerated appreciation of the peso and the mounting current account deficit. By 1991, this had already reached a historical high at 4.8 percent of GDP, followed by an unsustainable 6.9 percent in 1992.
Microeconomic Reforms
On the microeconomic front, significant reforms were made to support the liberalization process. Revisions and modifications were made to the legal framework governing financial markets. Among the general objectives of these changes were: 1) to eliminate excessive regulation; 2) to improve the supervisory techniques of the CNB (National Banking Commission) and the CNV (National Securities Commission); 3) to foster competition among industry participants; 4) to take advantage of economies of scale and increase the capitalization of financial intermediaries; and 5) partially to eliminate barriers to entry. The reforms of the legal framework were undertaken through a gradual process initiated by the so-called "Financial Package", submitted by the Salinas administration and approved by Congress in 1989-90. Additional reforms were adopted in 1991-93. A summary of these microeconomic reforms is given in Table 2. 10 During 1989 and 1990, government revenue from the privatization of the two national airlines, the national mining company (Cananea) and a percentage of its shares in the telephone company TELMEX, amounted to USD 3 billion. Subsequent government revenues from bank privatization and the sale of its remaining participation in TELMEX represented 2.7 percent of GDP. Most of the resources obtained were used to amortize the government's internal debt (Arellano and Rojas 1994) . Ortiz (1994) However, the microeconomic reforms were incomplete. The Mexican authorities unrealistically expected that financial intermediation in a liberalized environment would be successful if based exclusively on improved supervision, without recognizing how much the analytical and informational structures (for accounting and disclosure) had suffered during the years of nationalization among the banks. Moreover, the fundamental and perverse problems of incentive, which exist in the creditor-borrower relationship and condition the viability of financial intermediation, were not addressed. While improved supervision was extremely important and necessary, it was not sufficient in addressing these problems of incentive, nor did it address the implicit high cost of a deficient legal framework and weak, slow, costly and often corrupt judicial and enforcement mechanisms.
The basic foundations for sound financial intermediation can be enumerated under six headings: 1) proper screening and licensing of new entrants; 2) properly capitalized banks; 3) sound banking practices and procedures; 4) an adequate legal framework; 5) adequate judicial practices and enforcement mechanisms; and 6) strong supervision, regulation and enforcement. Of these six basic elements, the Mexican financial liberalization process omitted the first five, and the last was also deficient. This was partially responsible for the post-liberalization crisis which erupted in December 1994. Table 3 summarizes the "missing" reforms: 
The Results of Financial Liberalization
In the first instance, the results of financial liberalization can be seen by looking at the economy's financial depth and increased credit availability to the private sector. Both of these indicators are discussed briefly below.
Financial Depth
The monetary aggregate M4 is the broadest definition of money in Mexico.
11 Figure 1 shows the evolution of financial depth (M4/GDP) in Mexico and its changing composition over time (measured by the ratio M4/M1). The latter measurement highlights the increasing importance of non-monetary components, showing that this monetary aggregate has undergone a rapid shift in focus away from narrow money to non-bank and other interest-bearing elements.
Financial depth in the Mexican economy, measured by the ratio of M4/GDP, averaged less than 27 percent during the period 1980-1988. Liberalization policies adopted in 1989 included: 1) liberalization of interest rates and the elimination of maximum tenors for traditional deposit-based instruments; 2) substitution of obligatory reserve requirements for a "liquidity coefficient" which called for 30 percent of bank assets to be invested in government securities; 3) elimination of credit rationing; and 4) elimination of financing to the government at below market rates. Due to these policies, financial depth increased substantially in a very short period of time: to 30 percent in 1989 and 33 percent in 1990. By 1994 financial deepening had reached 45 percent of GDP, falling to 43 percent in 1998. The ratio of M4 to M1 reached its peak in 1989, coinciding with the historic peak of outstanding government securities, which represented over 20 percent of GDP. Despite the decline in the budget deficit which began in 1990, the trend in the composition of M4 continued to be away from narrow money, with the ratio of M4 to M1 growing from less than 3 in the later part of the 1970s to over 5 by the end of the 1990s.
Greater financial depth and increased security of the M4 monetary aggregate have enhanced the robustness of the Mexican financial markets. This indicator exemplifies a positive result of the financial liberalization process. However, Mexico's financial depth and the move away from narrow money are still low compared to other more financially developed countries of the region, in particular Chile. The low level of financial depth in the Mexican economy indicates the "drag" which the banking system has represented for the economy and productivity levels, as well as for the potential growth of local financial markets. The low level of securitization reflects partly the immature financial market, partly the extent of non-financial savings and partly capital flight.
Credit to the Private Sector
In the wake of financial liberalization, over-optimism led to a rapid "explosion" in credit during the years when macroeconomic conditions were favorable. Bank credit to the private sector grew eight times faster than GDP in the years prior to the 1994 crisis. Commercial bank credit to the private sector grew from less than 15 percent of GDP during 1980-89 to over 40 percent by 1994, as shown in Figure 2 . Within this growth was significantly increased lending to high-risk sectors.
The growth in the credit to the private sector might at first sight be understood as a positive result of the financial liberalization process. However, the quality of loan decisions left much to be desired. Adverse selection and moral hazard were clearly present, reflecting asymmetric information and an undeveloped credit risk culture. This, 
Source: Central Bank Elimination of Credit Rationing combined with the emergence of excessive leverage in the corporate sector and free riding arising from a problem of unequal information, culminated in financial crisis.
Interest Rate Movements During the Liberalization: Intermediation Spreads
An important, though less dramatic aspect of financial liberalization is the degree to which it affects interest rates, and in particular, bank intermediation spreads. On the liability side, increased competition between banks would eventually be reflected in higher deposit rates, encouraging savings. On the asset side, increased competition would be reflected in lower lending rates, encouraging investment. Increased efficiency in bank intermediation -an important goal of liberalization -should result in a narrowing of the gap between the two rates. The discussion below considers the behavior of the intermediation spread in Mexico before and after the financial reforms.
Methodology
Two alternative sets of data were used to construct the intermediation spread. The first comes directly from the balance sheets and income statements of the banking industry. The second comes from a survey of the financial cost of bank loans to local Mexican corporations reporting to the central bank, less the average cost of funds within the banking system.
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Using the banks' quarterly and annual balance sheets and income statements, a time series was constructed to approximate the intermediation spread for the period 1985-1998. Data from 1985 through 1990 are year-end annual and data from 1991 through 1998Q2 are quarterly 13 . The average lending and deposit rates are "ex-post" rates from the banks' financial statements. They are calculated respectively as the ratio of interest and commissions received to interest-generating assets, and interest and commissions paid to interest-generating liabilities.
Monthly survey data of the financial cost of loans to large Mexican corporates can be broken down into the explicit (contractual) interest charges and the effective cost of loans which include other additional costs such as fees and commissions, compensating balances, etc. In order to determine the effective intermediation spread, the effective rate on loans was compared to the weighted average cost of bank liabilities as reflected by the monthly average cost of funds published by the central bank (CPP).
14 It should be noted that the CPP over-estimates the banks' cost of funds by excluding the cost of demand deposits (and consequently underestimates the true size of the spread). The sample period runs from June 1978 through August 1998. Unfortunately, the two sources of information used are less than perfect: the construction of spreads from bank accounting information has some well-known methodological shortcomings which, combined with the shortcomings of Mexico's accounting system prior to January 1997, requires that we interpret the results with great 12 Banco de México (1998). 13 Quarterly interest income flows are annualized to make them consistent with the balance sheet figures. 14 CPP = "Costo Porcentual Promedio". caution 15 . Because of this, survey data are a more reliable source of information, with the caveat that they only represent a partial view of economy-wide bank spreads, to the extent that they cover only working capital loans and other loans contracted by large Mexican companies. Such companies are traditionally charged lower rates than their retail and medium-sized loan counterparts. Moreover, the survey data lead to an estimate of the banks' marginal lending rates, while the accounting information calculates the average return on assets influenced by the inertia of banks' past lending. In this sense, the two data sets are not strictly comparable. Figure 3 shows a comparison between the intermediation spread resulting from each set of data.
The spreads from survey data averaged 7.63% over the 20-year monthly sample period, with a standard deviation of 4.57%. In contrast, spreads arising from accounting information averaged 5.8 percent over the 1985-1998 Q2 sample period, with a standard deviation of 1.7 percent.
The data indicate that both series roughly coincide in times of financial stability (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , when both fluctuated around 4-7 percent, and diverge at times of financial difficulty. Two of these latter periods are identified in the figure: The first is during 1987-1988 when Mexico experienced inflation in three figures; the second is during the 1995 financial crisis. In 1997-1998 the figures also diverge, partly because of the adoption of 15 Until 1997, Mexican bank accounting standards differed markedly from USGAAP standards. Note that, given the importance of FOBAPROA (Deposit Insurance Fund) bonds received by the banks in exchange for bad assets, and the characteristics of those bonds (zero coupon maturing in a 10-year period), interest income does not reflect actual cash flows, since interest on these bonds accrues and (for most banks) does not generate cash revenues. the new accounting standards. Given the comparative advantage of survey data over accounting information for the construction of spreads, the former, despite being more volatile than the latter, will be used for further discussion. Figure 4 shows the intermediation spread, and Figure 5 shows commissions (as implied by the survey data) in more detail. Commissions are shown as the difference between effective and contractual lending rates. The fluctuations in intermediation spreads and bank commissions (shown as the difference between effective and contractual rates) follow the same pattern. They rise before and during the period of bank nationalization, with a drop following interest-rate liberalization. The decline was reinforced by increased price competition in the wake of bank privatization. This is an important finding, showing that during periods of financial restriction, when interest rates are subject to controls, banks by-pass these restrictions with other charges which must be covered by non-preferential borrowers. Liberalization leads to a rapid decline in these implicit charges (commissions), making interest rates reflect more accurately and transparently the actual cost of borrowing.
MEXICO

Interpreting movements in the intermediation spread
MEXICO INTERMEDIATION SPREADS (Effective Corporate Loan Rates vs. CPP)
Pre-liberalization trends
From 1978 until April-August 1989, when interest rates were deregulated and credit rationing was finally abandoned, intermediation spreads were affected by two important factors besides the financially restrictive environment: 1) the nationalization of the banking industry; and 2) a decade of high inflation with significant episodes of financial and economic turmoil. The combination of these two factors was immediately translated into high intermediation spreads as seen in Table 4 below: Prior to the nationalization of the banks, both the intermediation spread and bank commissions were on the rise. This was partly due to accelerating inflation, which climbed from 16 percent in 1978 to 74 percent by September 1982 when the banks were nationalized. At that point the banking community was accused by President Jose Lopez Portillo of facilitating capital flight, and of predatory market practices at the expense of Mexican workers' welfare. In response, banks were nationalized by the Constitutional reforms of September 1982, which initiated the "lost decade" of the eighties. This decade was characterized by practically no economic growth and periods of high inflation, particularly during 1987-1988, when average inflation rates were consistently over 100%.
The effect of bank nationalization on interest-rate spreads is difficult to isolate because it occurred at the height of the 1982 financial crisis, which initiated the inflationary process which lasted until the end of the decade. Spreads increased from an average of 520 basis points prior to nationalization, at a time when monthly (year-onyear) inflation rates averaged 27 percent, to 1050 basis points during the height of the nationalization period (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) , when inflation rates rose to an average of 90 percent. However, some evidence suggests that factors other than increased inflation accounted for the rising intermediation spread during this period.
During the years of state ownership, banking losses arising from government financing at below market rates were transferred to the private sector by means of higher rates and a higher bank spread (cross-subsidization). Bank financial statements show this practice, since the industry's net profits increased consistently in real terms between 1982 and 1989-90. Return on assets (ROA) also increased consistently during this period, from 0.44 in 1982 to 1.17 in 1990, with a peak in 1988 of 1.86. Non-interest revenue, comprised almost entirely of commissions charged for banking services, increased by 100 percent in real terms between 1982 and 1990. This transfer of wealth from the private sector to the government-owned banking industry worked as an additional intermediation tax on private borrowers.
Post-liberalization trends
After April-August 1989, the resources released from reduced reliance of the government's budget on the commercial banks, 16 combined with interest-rate liberalization, allowed banks to engage in more profitable activities than before. Larger volumes of domestic and external resources were now available to be channeled to the private sector at more attractive rates. Since the beginning of the liberalization process, one of the goals of commercial banks was to encourage individuals and small businesses who had never used banking services to do so for the first time. Greater market penetration was accompanied by lower lending rates and smaller intermediation spreads, which were also explained by the abolition of cross-subsidization, lower inflation and increased competition. As a result, average intermediation spreads during 1989-1994 declined to 550 basis points. This lasted until the eve of the next financial crisis, which erupted in December 1994.
During the period June 1991 to July 1992, the 18 state-owned commercial banks were privatized. The first market-based response to privatization was fierce competition among them to increase their customer base on both the asset and liability fronts. Competition reduced the intermediation spread and the commission charged on banking services. However, the spread was prevented from declining further for several reasons:
(a) The very high prices paid for the privatized banks. Banks were overpriced and sold, on average, at 3.5 times their actual value (with prices fluctuating between 2.5 and 5.3 times the actual value). Much of the cost incurred by the new bank owners was covered by incurring internal and external debt, which required servicing and amortization. This put pressure on the banks to obtain high and quick returns on their investments.
(b) The investment required to modernize the technologically outdated banking system after a decade in the hands of the state.
(c) The higher risks being taken by banks as new unproven borrowers were accepted.
(d) The drag resulting from the less than desirable quality of the loan portfolios acquired (which had been hidden by the inadequacy of existing accounting practices).
(e) The oligopolistic banking industry created after bank privatization. Three banks 17 alone controlled over 60 percent of the banking industry's assets and liabilities. Their cartel, led by the giant Banamex, allowed the pricing of banking services above marginal cost, forcing other smaller banks to become price followers.
In 1994, some of the solvency problems in the banking system were already evident, which forced the authorities to intervene in the case of two of the original 18 privatized banks, and to invite foreign investors to purchase them. Interest spreads widened very sharply prior to and during the December 1994 banking crisis and liquidity crunch.
Risk profile of lending
As shown in Table 5 , real lending exploded following the banks' privatization, while the (highly understated) volume of overdue loans climbed continuously. Owners received a speculative return on their investment in undercapitalized and underprovisioned banks, which were going to collapse after the severe external shock. The riskier lending profile of the newly privatized banks, together with (as already mentioned) excessively rapid credit expansion in a very poorly regulated environment and a deficient legal-judicial infrastructure, accelerated a systemic solvency crisis which was detonated by the sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994. . Pages 23 and 27. * Includes banks which suffered intervention. ** Excludes banks which suffered intervention. 1. Under the old accounting standards (prior to January 1997) banks classified as "overdue" only the unpaid portion of the loan, rather than the whole loan. This grossly underestimated non-performing loans. Moreover, banks continued to accrue interest on delinquent loans (no interest-suspension clause). 2. Due to very poor supervision and deficient internal systems, banks had a severely deficient system for classifying loans according to risk, and provisions were accordingly grossly inadequate.
By March 1995, the financial condition of the newly privatized banks had deteriorated considerably. The negative effects of the rise in interest rates 18 and the currency devaluation worked themselves into the banks' income statements through the open positions held in the money and foreign exchange markets (cf. Garber and FolkertsLandau, 1997). The reported condition of the banks was exacerbated by the problem of overdue loans, which until then had been concealed by poor accounting practices.
After the initial shock of the crisis had been absorbed, the interest spread gradually declined. From the peak of 39 percent in March 1995, it dropped to a monthly average of 5.9 percent in 1996, 4.8 percent in 1997 and 6.4 percent in 1998 Q3. This was despite local banks focusing on loan loss reserves and capital buildup in order to confront the growing problem of non-performing loans (on top of the massive sales of nonperforming loans to the Deposit Insurance Fund -FOBAPROA).
After the crisis
After the shock of the 1994-95 crisis had been absorbed, and more than 5 years into the liberalization period, other important forces affecting interest spreads were also at work. The following factors exerted upward pressure:
1) The macroeconomic fundamentals improved, initiating an export-led recovery. Once the peso was devalued, Mexican exports were extremely competitive in a booming US market. This boom led to renewed growth as real GDP increased by 5.2 percent in 1996 and 7 percent in 1997, compared to the drastic drop of over 6 percent in 1995. Rapid economic activity increased the demand for credit. However, banks were too weak and too risk-averse to lend, and in fact lending to the private sector continued to decline sharply. By the end of 1998, credit to the private sector had fallen by 60 percent in real terms relative to its peak of 1994. 2) The debate following the government's presentation of a financial package to Congress in March 1998 increased the political uncertainty and reopened the debate over how to allocate the enormous losses resulting from the banking crisis (estimated by the government at US$65 billion, close to 15 percent of GDP). By 1997, 13 banks had undergone formal intervention, 7 of which were newcomers to the industry.
3) The possibility that the banking industry might have to absorb a larger share of the costs resulting from the mountain of non-performing loans sold to FOBAPROA, either totally or partially, might have led to renewed bank insolvency. The anticipation of further losses and the increased uncertainty resulted in higher intermediation spreads.
4) The financial fragility of the banking system and the worsening situation of many of the debtors, many of them in default, called for additional government financial relief programs.
5) The negative carry-over resulting from having to fund FOBAPROA zerocoupon bonds at the interbank rate (TIIE), while these bonds accrued at an interest rate of (Cetes plus 200 basis points) during the first three years and (CETES minus 135 basis points) during the remaining life of the bonds (7 more years).
On the other hand, and exerting downward pressure on the spreads, was the increased competition from newcomers to the industry, particularly the 18 foreign banks. 21 Given the weak financial state of the Mexican banks, the newcomers could easily compete for corporate clients, who shifted their businesses from already established banks to foreign banks backed by powerful offshore parents. 22 Commercial banks competed to widen their customer base and reduced their spreads to gain market share. Even more important than the enhanced domestic competition in reducing the spreads was the easy access that Mexican exporters had to international sources of funding. In this respect, there was an increasing segmentation of the market and increased disintermediation, as the best corporate clients were able to borrow abroad, while domestically-oriented companies and SMEs were unable to borrow.
The question of commissions
The 1995 financial crisis brought credit activity to a standstill, except among the large Mexican corporates and multinational organizations, which were perceived by the banking community as the only creditworthy borrowers in the country. These institutions are very few in number, but they received heavily preferential treatment from the banks. One way the 40 Mexican banks competed for the group's potential business was by eliminating or reducing the commission charged for banking services. Prior to the liberalization process, since banks were obliged to grant credit at preferential interest rates, one of the compensating factors was a substantial charge on banking services for non-preferential borrowers. During 1982-89, commissions represented a surcharge of 300 basis points over contractual interest rates, while during 1989-94 these charges declined to 70 basis points. Following the crisis, commissions represented less than 20 basis points of the total effective lending rates. 21 Many of these had begun to operate since 1994. 22 By December 1998 the market share held by foreign banks relative to deposits taken had reached 16.3%.
The survey data indicate that commissions were practically at zero after the crisis. Strong competition between banks, along with more personalized customer attention, gave large corporate firms a significant degree of negotiating power. This drove down commission charges practically to zero, and interest rates began to reveal more closely the actual cost of credit. Retail banking commissions and fees, however, remained an important and growing source of revenue for the banking industry.
The survey data also indicate that both the spread and the rate of commission have declined over time, as has their potential volatility. Despite the weight of overdue loans, borrowers and savers alike have benefited from declining spreads since the liberalization process began in 1989. However, society as a whole will be confronted with the future cost of eventually bailing out the Mexican banking system.
International Interest Differentials
In previous sections we examined the "lending rate spread", defined as the difference between the nominal lending rate and a representative deposit rate. The other key interest differential, sometimes known 23 as the "deposit rate spread" is the gap between domestic wholesale deposit rates and a international equivalent of comparable default risk, adjusted for exchange rate change. It is normally assumed that the first type of spread is driven more by microeconomic factors in the financial sector, while the second type depends more on macroeconomic conditions and expectations.
Uncovered interest-rate parity (UIP -which would prevail in a world free of controls and dominated by risk-neutral investors) would imply a zero expected deposit rate spread. After all, why (apart from default risk and the effects of risk aversion) should the domestic peso return of a Mexican government bond be expected to yield more than a comparable US Government bond, adjusted for the depreciation or appreciation of the Mexican peso against the US dollar. Ex post deviations from UIP 24 could additionally result from deviations actual from expected nominal exchange rate change. Figure 6 compares the yield (1 + i c ) on 28-day CETES auctioned by the Banco de México on behalf of the Government, with the realized yield in Mexican pesos that would have been gained by holding a US Treasury Bill with similar maturity, where the dollar yield on the Treasury Bill is (1 + i us ) and the rate of exchange rate change is (1 + x). Specifically, it shows, for 1985-98, the ex post excess return on holding domestic currency assets:
For most of the period D>0, implying that it was usually better for investors to place their funds in Mexican pesos than to invest in equivalent dollar-denominated financial assets, 23 Vieira da Cunha and Brock (1997) 24 Tanner (1998) .
even after taking account of the exchange rate change. The much higher domestic rates that prevail in Mexico compared to the US more than compensated for the potential currency fluctuations. But there were exceptional periods: during episodes of external crisis in which the Mexican peso depreciated abruptly against the US dollar in discrete large amounts, it would have been better for depositors to have dollar-denominated investments. This was particularly true during three particular crises: (i) from the second half of 1985 through most of 1986, which culminated with a sharp depreciation (over 200) of the Mexican peso; (ii) the fourth quarter of 1987, when the peso depreciated by 24 in just three months; and (iii) the last quarter of 1994 and all of 1995, following the major BOP and banking crisis.
The standard explanation for this kind of pattern in Latin American countries subject to large currency instability is as follows:
"Expectations of exchange rate depreciation typically are the largest component of a high deposit rate spread. In many countries that undertake exchange rate-based inflation stabilization programs, for example, inflation falls but the public continues to believe that stabilization will only be temporary. Because people lack confidence that exchange rate policies will be maintained, they demand a rate of return on domestic currency-denominated deposits that compensates them for the expected devaluation (the so-called peso problem). As a result ex post real interest rates rise, placing greater strain on firms and banks, slowing growth, and reinforcing expectations of a depreciation". This comment indicates a particular chain of causality, in the sense that it is the perceived high foreign exchange risk that puts pressure on domestic real interest rates. That is, in an effort to defend the parity of the domestic currency, many countries have no choice but to allow very high domestic real interest rates.
Large and persistent deviations from the UIP during the whole period examined (January 1985 to January 1998) are, except for crisis episodes, largely explained by significant real interest-rate differentials between Mexico and the US. 26 This also reflects the greater country risk expressed by the higher level and variability of Mexican inflation, plus other restrictions which make capital flow less than frictionless.
It is of interest to see how the behavior of foreign financial investors in the Mexican money market is correlated with the excess return differential D.
27 Before the 1994 crisis, these investors, as a group, reduced their exposure to peso-denominated money market instruments prior to the crisis. That is, they switched back to dollars, though perhaps with some hesitation, as suggested by the oscillations during 1993, evident from the Figure. A large peak in the value of D coincided with a slowing of the drain in early 1994, but it this was followed by the dramatic decline in D at the time of the December 1994 devaluation. It seems that some months may have elapsed between the decline in D and the abrupt fall in CETES held by foreigners. The absence of foreign investors lasted throughout 1995. However, even small positive values of D were a sufficient inducement to attract them back to peso-denominated papers once confidence was restored in 1996 and 1997.
Parallels and Contrasts with Other Experiences
The distinctive character of Mexico's case can be highlighted by juxtaposing it with that of some other cases. Indeed, other cases have always been relevant to the debate on liberalization in Mexico. The unfortunate experience with liberalization episodes in the southern cone during the 1970s and early 1980s, when Chile, Argentina and Uruguay experienced extremely volatile conditions following rapid liberalization of highly restricted financial markets, and then experienced extremely volatile post-liberalization periods, probably delayed the adoption of reform processes in Mexico and other countries in Latin America. Nevertheless, the consequences of the eventual liberalization in Mexico seem at first sight to parallel that in, for example, Chile, which experienced increasing domestic and external indebtedness, high real interest rates and financial crisis ultimately requiring massive bailouts of the domestic banking system.
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Initial liberalization conditions: And indeed Mexico shared with Chile a failure to put in place the necessary microeconomic and macroeconomic conditions, which experience has shown are crucial for an effective transition to a market-based financial 26 Note that this finding is not inconsistent with Tanner's results -in which the rational expectations hypothesis cannot be rejected for Mexico -since he is testing for an expected value of (D t -D t-1 ) equal to zero. In our case, the mean of such differences is also zero. 27 We offer this preliminary interpretation, but certainly this topic requires a more in-depth analysis. 28 See Bianchi (1994). system. Like Chile, Mexico began its reforms with poor growth and relatively high inflation, low savings rates, weak bank supervision and shallow financial markets, having experienced long periods of financial restriction. Despite Mexico's successful adjustment program aimed at stabilizing the economy during the 1987-1988 recession (which led to two-figure inflation and negative growth), the overall economy remained fragile, with a solid basis for sustained growth still unsure by 1989 when some of the most important liberalization policies were adopted.
The pace of financial liberalization: And like Chile, Mexico adopted a "big bang" approach towards financial liberalization. In Mexico, complete interest rate deregulation was adopted in 1989, and full bank privatization by 1992. In Chile, interest rates were completely deregulated by 1975, and the last banks privatized in 1978. In both countries, the time span between these two major liberalization events was three years. But speed is not necessarily associated with turmoil. New Zealand is an example where liberalization occurred at a lightning pace, much faster than the speedy rates adopted by Mexico and Chile. New Zealand, whose liberalization process is considered a success story, moved instantaneously (by policy-making standards) to abandon a wide array of controls within a 9-month period in 1984-5.
Financing of Government Deficit:
In its approach to financing the government deficit during the liberalization, Mexico's strategy can be seen in a more favorable light. Consider Turkey, which also started with a rapid approach towards reform that also led to a financial crisis and to the government's intervention to reverse some of the liberalization measures, at least temporarily.
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Turkey's reforms were impeded by the continued heavy reliance on the banks to finance the large public sector deficit. In this respect, Mexico's gradual efforts towards developing a successful alternative for government financing can be praised. The introduction of the first government security (1978-CETES) initiated a process of modernization and a deepening of the Mexican money market. This allowed the government to switch from direct bank financing to raising funds by means of the outright sale of government securities in the open market. The strong institutional base, combined with the transparency and regularity of the auctions, formed the basis for the wide acceptance by Mexican institutional investors of this option for government financing.
Reliance on market after the crash: Mexico's current approach to crisis resolution can be seen as much less reliant on the market than was Chile's ultimately successful path following crisis. In Chile, as opposed to Mexico, a more "market-based" solution to the banking crisis was adopted, actually forcing some banks to close down.
Stop and Go-Liberalization Processes:
Because of the severe banking crisis that occurred in Mexico in the aftermath of the liberalization process, some opposition parties argued that reforms should be reversed. Certain members of Congress even proposed the extreme solution of renationalizing the banking industry. These proposals are not peculiar to Mexico: other countries in similar liberalization stages, when confronted with collapsing financial institutions, have actually taken steps, not to abort the liberalization process, but to reverse temporarily some of the measures adopted.
As an example of reversal, the case of Colombia is worth mentioning. In Colombia, during the 1970s and 1980s, the financial system was highly restricted, inefficient and uncompetitive, with intermediation spreads which were typically high. Colombian policy-makers set out to liberalize the financial system completely by the early 1990s. However, financial reform was reversed to some degree as a result in changes in macro-policy. Policy-makers attempted to sterilize the build-up of reserves between 1989 and 1995 with a restrictive monetary policy, and at times through increased taxation. They were able to reduce reserve requirements and forced investments from their late 1970s peak of around 50 percent of total bank deposits to about 20 percent by the end of the 1980s. However, the early 1990s saw a renewed increase to about 32 percent, and in recent years the ratio has remained at around 20 percent. 30 Colombia also reversed some of the liberalization measures through direct controls on credit expansion and taxes on foreign borrowing.
Because of Colombia's "temporary" liberalization reversals, intermediation spreads remained essentially the same during the pre-and post-liberalization periods. During the pre-liberalization period ) the spread ranged between 16 and 32 percentage points, increasing steadily from 1974 to a peak in 1979, and then falling gradually to just under 19 percent in 1988. During the post-liberalization period , the spread declined steadily from its initial level of about 25 percent in 1991 to 19 percent in 1996.
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Temporary interruptions or even reversals in financial liberalization cannot and should not always be avoided. The Colombian case highlights the emergence of tradeoffs between the long-term goals of policy reform and the short-term objectives of macro-stabilization policies. But if the reversals are seen as casting doubt on the credibility of the whole process, the adverse market reactions that may occur can be very damaging.
Conclusions
This study has analyzed the behavior of interest-rate spreads in Mexico, in the context of financial liberalization and external disturbances. We first reviewed the process of financial liberalization in a rapidly changing macroeconomic and external environment. We provided a description of the timing and sequencing of the various measures adopted, along with a discussion of the behavior of domestic interest spread and the uncovered interest parity condition. A comparison between some specific instances of the financial liberalization process in other countries was then presented. Our conclusions are as follows:
Financial stability in a post-liberalization environment depends on two fundamental sets of factors. The first comprises the macroeconomic and structural conditions of the real economy. The second is the robustness of the financial system 30 Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (1998) . 31 Ibid., page 6. itself, comprising financial markets, institutions and arrangements through which financial transactions are carried out.
Weaknesses in macroeconomic management were the first source of Mexico's financial fragility. In Mexico, the "boom-bust" cycle over the last 25 years has created widespread uncertainty and perverse reversals in the development of the financial sector. High exchange-rate and interest-rate volatility, combined with large private capital inflows and terms of trade shocks, followed by recession, have been associated with large potential losses for the banking sector. In addition, high inflation has eroded the information base for business planning and sound credit appraisal, contributing to higher portfolio risks. The demand for bank loans has also been discouraged by high nominal interest rates, hampering the development of financial markets, and particularly of debt instruments with longer maturities.
Policy-making during the Salinas administration (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) did not evade the boom-bust cycle. The excessive reliance on volatile short-term external financing, and the defense of an exchange rate which was out of line with market fundamentals, led to a sudden correction of asset prices and the subsequent crisis. The macroeconomic costs are large in terms of growth foregone. The Federal Government's contingent liabilities associated with systemic bank restructuring will exceed 15 percent of GDP (1994 to the present), compared with 30 percent in Chile (1981-87) , and 20 percent in Venezuela (1994 to the present).
The second source of financial fragility can be traced to weaknesses in the incentive structure provided by the financial and institutional frameworks, market discipline and regulatory and supervisory structures. As we noted above most of what are normally regarded as the essential foundations for sound financial intermediation were absent in Mexico. What is now needed is a more balanced approach, looking at the whole "production chain" for delivering the "complete product" (i.e., abundant, riskpriced, enforceable loan contracts). Without addressing some of the fundamental problems in Mexico's financial infrastructure, which pre-date the latest banking crisis, financial intermediation will not deliver the expected results in supporting sustainable economic development.
The lack of a modern, effective legal and regulatory framework was a major drawback for the successful achievement of a sound and healthy financial system operating in a liberalized environment. Changes in the legal, accounting and regulatory frameworks which govern the activities of the banking sector should have conformed to international standards long before the privatization process started.
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A third factor contributing to Mexico's financial fragility was the lack of transparency about banks' operations and financial conditions, making it difficult for 32 Inadequate laws relating governing corporations, bankruptcy, contracts and private property, as well as ineffectual judicial enforcement, all contribute to a breakdown in credit discipline -leading to a higher incidence of non-performing loans and a lower collection rate -and inhibit the development of a credit culture. stakeholders to exercise proper market discipline -rewarding good performers and shunning poor ones. Creditors failed to discipline poor performers because of distorted incentives and a lack of timely and accurate information.
33 Government intervention also blunted incentives to discipline poor performers, by creating strong expectations that owners and creditors would be bailed out. Weak exit policy and universal deposit protection exacerbated moral hazard. Explicit government guarantees also played a role in fuelling unsustainable credit booms. Once credit quality had been compromised, regulatory shortcomings and supervisory indulgence aggravated matters by failing to identify problems early and address them in a timely fashion.
The combination of macroeconomic instability and incomplete microeconomic reforms, including inadequate disclosure of timely and accurate information and severe problems of moral hazard, together with the risks of the financial liberalization process per se -such as increased exposure to market and credit risks -finally resulted in technical bank failures. It follows that until risk-control measures (the first building blocks in the proper sequencing of reforms) are in place, it is counter-productive to liberalize fully.
Despite some of the adverse outcomes described above, there are some positive results from the financial liberalization process: it planted the seeds for more competitive and contestable financial markets. Competitive markets are essential if private gains and social returns from financial decisions are to be consistent. Uncompetitive markets encourage the inefficient use of resources to extract rents from other agents, limiting gains to society as a whole. Lack of competition seriously undermines incentives for good institutional governance and impairs market discipline.
Bank privatization, the elimination of barriers to entry and unrestricted interest rates have fostered an environment of increased competition among Mexican banks. A competitive environment does not necessarily require a large number of institutions, nor does it exclude the presence of institutions with substantial market share. However, the market must be "contestable", in that market shares and prices are market-driven, leading to competitive outcomes. The behavior of interest rates in Mexico has provided evidence that liberalization leads to a rapid decline in implicit loan charges (commissions), making interest rates reflect more accurately and transparently the actual cost of borrowing. This has filtered through to other interest rates, especially those of securities traded in the secondary markets, whose "contestability" has been greatly enhanced by means of widespread information about the behavior of market participants. 34 Financial deepening in Mexico has also increased significantly since 1989, when some of the most important financial liberalization reforms were introduced. During 1980-88 the M4/GDP ratio was less than 27 percent; by the end of 1997 it had reached 42 percent. Despite the marked increase over the last 10 years, its level still remains low 33 The move towards US GAAP accounting standards initiated in 1997 is an important measure to increase transparency in commercial bank financial information. 34 This has been achieved largely through the widespread use of brokers, whose participation in the financial markets has increased considerably since 1990. compared to other countries with a similar per-capita income, such as Chile. However, the road towards deeper financial markets has been paved. Deeper financial markets make the system more robust and consequently better prepared to face internal and external shocks.
The behavior of the intermediation spread has shown gains in efficiency since the liberalization of interest rates. The immediate response was a declining trend, which was reinforced by bank privatizations. After liberalization, the intermediation spread averaged 550 basis points (excluding the year 1995, at the height of the crisis), down from an average of 1050 basis points during most of the 1980s.
Uncovered interest parity shows a deviation from the arbitrage condition in favor of investing in foreign assets during times of financial crisis. However, during non-crisis periods, the incentives are reversed in favor of investing in local government securities. In general, the premium for investing in Mexican securities, as opposed to their foreign counterparts, has been positive. Significant increases in portfolio investments by foreign savers during the Salinas administration provide evidence for this.
Although the transition from a financially restricted to a liberalized market environment has been a critical component of the modernization of Mexico's banking system, further progress needs to be made to increase efficiency and to enhance a stronger credit and risk management culture. The banking crisis and the elimination of barriers to entry for both domestic and foreign investors have increased awareness of these issues. However, Mexico's greatest challenge ahead is to find some of the missing pieces -and particularly to reduce the legal risks that now prevail -in order to strengthen the foundations of a modern financial system.
